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A LITTLE STORY ABOUT METANARRATIVES: 
LYOTARD, RELIGION, AND POSTMODERNISM 
REVISTED 
James K. A. Smith 
Christian scholars, when challenged by the pluriform phenomenon of 
"postmodernism," quickly seized upon Jean-Francois Lyotard's 'definition' 
in the Introduction to The Pos/modern Condition: "Simplifying to the 
extreme," Lyotard begins, "I define postmodcrn ,IS incredulity toward met,l-
narratives [grand re~itsl." If this is the case, the question is raised: how can 
Christian faith, grounded in the "meta narrative" of the biblical canon, be 
viable in postmodernity? But is the biblical story or Christian faith a meta-
narrative? For Lyotard, the term "metanarrative" does not simply refer to a 
"grand story" in the sense of stories which have grand or universal preten-
sions, or even make universal claims. What is at stake is the nature of those 
claims. Given this more precise definition of metanarratives, I will argue 
that the biblical story is not a metanarrati\'e in Lyotard's sense. Ha\'ing 
noted this, the final portion of the article turns to a more positive under-
standing of the relation between biblical faith and Lyotard in particular, 
and postmodernism in general. 
The preoccupation with "the present"-our contemporaneity-which 
characterizes current philosophical discourse is not particularly new, 
though it is certainly a modem project whose origin is Kantian. Indeed, 
the posing of the question, "What is Enlightenment?,"! raised the tone of 
philosophy' to reflection on the present as a critical interrogation of "our 
time" and its significance: the question of what is happening, now. More 
than just an attempt to situate the present in relation to its past and future, 
Kant's question probes the meaning of the present and what it means to be 
"us"-to be here, now, contemporary. Arguing that Kant's essay "intro-
duces a new type of question into the field of philosophical reflection," 
Foucault remarks that "with this text on the Aufkliinmg we see philoso-
phy-and I don't think I'm exaggerating when I say that it is for the first 
time-problematizing its own discursive contemporaneity.'" In moderni-
ty, philosophy has redoubled itself insofar as it has put modernity into 
question; in other words, this critical philosophy could be characterized as 
"the discourse of modernity on modernity."" Originating with modernity, 
the question of who we are becomes a question of our present, our "now." 
While "we postmoderns" may have abandoned any "idea for a univer-
sal history from a cosmopolitan point of view," our preoccupation with 
naming the present betrays our modern filiation and Enlightenment 
genealogy. While this original philosophical reflection on the present, 
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encapsulated in the query "What is Enlightenment?" is, in our present, for-
mulated as a different query-"Wllat is postmodernism?"5-the question-
ing itself is modem. And so, to "we postmodems," I might pronounce: 
"My fellow postmodems, there are no postmodems," insofar as our pen-
chant to describe our present--even as rupture-is indicative of a modem 
project." 
We might understand Jean-Fran<;:ois Lyotard's own project in his The 
Post modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge within this Kantian tradition of 
naming the present. Faced with the question, Lyotard picked up the 
gauntlet and tackled the challenge early on: "Simplifying to the extreme," 
he remarks, "I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives 
lcs-rand re~its]."7 And for various reasons,' his answer has been quickly 
adopted as a succinct formulation of our present condition, particularly by 
scholars operating within the Christian tradition. Christian scholars (partic-
ularly those within the evangelical tradition), when challenged by the plu-
riform phenomenon of postmodernism, quickly seized upon Lyotard's 
'definition' and thus consider the challenge of postmodernism in terms of 
Lyotard's definition and the viability of metanarratives." Richard 
Middleton and Brian Walsh, for instance, devote two chapters of their 
important and original book, Truth Is Stranger Than It Used To Be, to the 
question of how biblical faith, which they understand to be grounded in a 
metanarrative, could be viable in postmodernity, which is characterized by 
an incredulity toward metanarratives.lO A similar concern is expressed in 
the work of Catholic theologian Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt who, in 
contesting Lyotard's notion of the "end" of metanarratives, seeks to offer 
"the possibility of a true (or real) metanarrative presentation (or presence) 
of the sublime" as a viable theological alternative in a postmodern con-
text.ll For both, the biblical story is a metanarrative; however, they argue 
that it is not implicated in the violence of metanarratives-which they con-
sider to be the concern of the postmodern critique-because it contains 
within itself an "antitotalizing" and "ethical thrust" which undermines just 
such totalization and violence.12 
But is the biblical story a "metanarrative?" Is the scriptural narrative a 
"metanarrative" in the way that Lyotard speaks of the Hegelian system, or 
Marx's historical materialism, or the modern scientific narrative of 
progress? It is here that I think we would profit from carefully reading 
Lyotard's analysis. For Lyotard, the term "metanarrative" l'Srand refit] 
does not simply refer to a "grand story" in the sense of stories that have 
grand or universal pretensions, or even make universal claims. What is at 
stake is not the scope of these narratives but the nature of the claims they 
make. For Lyotard, metanarratives are a distinctly modern phenomenon: 
they are stories which not only tell a grand story (since even premodern 
and tribal stories do this), but also claim to be able to legitimate the story 
and its claims by an appeal to universal Reason. On Lyotard's account, the 
Enuma Elish, though telling a story which is universal or grand in scope, is 
nevertheless not a metanarrative because it does not claim to legitimate 
itself by an appeal to scientific Reason. On the other hand, Lyotard sees 
classical Marxism as a metanarrative insofar as it claims to be a system 
legitimated by Reason, and therefore to be universally accepted on that 
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basis. What is wrong with this is that such a modem grand reqit fails to see 
that it, too, is grounded in a myth and faith-commitments.13 As a result, 
postmodernity's "incredulity toward metanarratives" ought to be under-
stood as an opportunity for religious thought in a contemporary context-
an ally rather than a foe. 
Given this more precise definition of metanarratives, I will argue (contra 
Middleton and Walsh, and others) that the biblical story is not a metanarra-
tive in Lyotard's sense. Yes, it makes grand, even universal claims (e.g., 
that every person is created in the image of God); but it does not-at least 
within a broadly conceived" Augustinian" tradition-claim to be legiti-
mated by Reason, but rather trusted in faith. To accomplish this, Part I will 
catalogue and outline a number of engagements with postmodernism (and 
Lyotard in particular) by Christian philosophers and theologians, in order 
to point out a common misreading of Lyotard and hence a prevailing mis-
construal of "our present:" viz., postmodernity. To attempt to correct this, 
Part II will offer a close reading of Lyotard's argument in The PostmodcrJ1 
Condition. Part III will then offer a re-reading of postmodernism as a 
unique opportunity for religious thought in "our time." 
I 
Like "deconstruction,"14 the term "metanarrative" has become a word 
which has never lacked employment, but has unfortunately been put to 
work doing jobs it never asked for. In other words, the term "metanarra-
tive" has been subject to equivocation and thus displaced from the very 
specific context of Lyotard's employment of the concept. The result, it 
seems, is a straw man. 
We see this confusion, for instance, in Middleton and Walsh's discus-
sion, where Lyotard's notion of a metanarrative is misconstrued in three 
ways. First, concerning the very definition of "metanarratives:" after citing 
Lyotard's definition of postmodernism as incredulity toward metanarra-
tives, they go on to explain what they suggest are, "[f]rom a postmodern 
perspective, [the] two central problems with metanarratives:" (a) that they 
are "universal" stories, (b) that they are totalizing or marginalizing. 16 In 
other words, they argue that the problem with metanarratives is their scope: 
a metanarrative "purports to be not simply a local story (an ad hoc, first-
order account of a community'S experience) but the universal story of the 
world from archc to telos, a grand narrative encompassing world history 
from beginning to end."17 They then go on to suggest-even though they 
concede Lyotard never says this"-that incredulity toward metanarratives 
entails "widespread suspicion of any comprehensive metanarrative of 
world history that makes 'total' claims" because such claims inevitably 
lead to violence.19 The problem with this explanation of metanarratives 
(and hence postmodernism) is that it lacks any grounding in Lyotard's dis-
cussion of metanarratives, and thus seriously misconstrues what "post-
modernism" would be. As we will see in Part II, the problem with meta-
narratives has nothing to do with the scope of their claims-that they are 
"large-scale" stories of "universal scope""l-but the nature of their legitima-
tion. 
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Second, in Middleton and Walsh the term "metanarrative" is conflated 
with other discourses concerning the "social construction" of meaning: "If 
metanarratives are social constructions, then, like abstract ethical systems, 
they are simply particular moral visions dressed up in the guise of univer-
sality."21 So on their accounting, what's wrong with metanarratives from a 
posbnodern perspective is the fact that they are merely social constructions 
masquerading as universal truths: local claims with universal pretensions. 
"To the postmodern mind," they conclude, "metanarratives are mere 
human constructs, fictive devices through which we impose an order on 
history and make it subject to us (hence they may be termed "master" nar-
ratives)."22 However, once again they are importing something into the 
notion of metanarrative which is absent from Lyotard's discussion, result-
ing in more bad press.23 
Third, as indicated above, Middleton and Walsh consider the second 
major problem with metanarratives to be an ethical one: as universal narra-
tives, metanarratives are hegemonic, violently excluding any who are "dif-
ferent" or reject the dominant story.24 While concerns with totalizing vio-
lence, marginalization, and oppression are certainly important aspects of 
postmodern critique,25 it must again be noted that this is not something that 
Lyotard advances with respect to metanarratives. We do well to recall (as 
we will do below) that the Postmodern Condition is A Report on Knowledge 
which thus revolves around the epistemological problem of legitimation or 
justification. 
However, given their reading of Lyotard, postmodernism, and metanar-
ratives, Middleton and Walsh pose the problem as follows: 
The problem, from a postmodern point of view, is that the Scriptures, 
in which Christians claim to ground their faith and in which we will 
seek answers to the worldview questions we have raised, constitute a 
metanarrative that makes universal claims. [ ... J SO the question we 
are confronted with ... is whether the Christian faith, rooted as it is in 
a metanarrative of cosmic proportions, is subject to the postmodern 
charge of totalizing violence.26 
As they note, this is to assume that Christian faith is grounded in a meta-
narrative: "The important question, then, would not be whether the 
Christian faith is rooted in a metanarrative, but what sort of metanarrative 
the Scriptures contain."27 My goal in this essay is to argue that whether 
Christian faith is rooted in a metanarrative is precisely the important ques-
tion. Because Middleton and Walsh have misunderstood the notion of 
metanarrative, they end up conceding that the biblical story is a metanarra-
tiVE', and thus pose the challenge of postmodernism in a way that is mis-
leading, or at least, misguided. When we turn to a close analysis of The 
Postmodcrn Condition, we must conclude that when we properly under-
stand "metanarratives," the biblical narrative does not constitute a meta-
narrative and thus Christian faith is not subject to the postmodern critique 
in the way that Middleton and Walsh suggest. 
Middleton and Walsh are not alone in their rendering of postmod-
ernism in general, or metanarratives in particular. While grounded in a 
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much closer reading of Lyotard, in his Primer on Postmodernism Stanley 
Grenz also misconstrues Lyotard's discussion by suggesting that postmod-
ernism finds fault with the mere universality of "metanarratives." In other 
words, Grenz also seems to think that it is the scope of metanarratives 
which is the problem: 
What makes our condition "postmodern" is not only that people no 
longer cling to the myths of modernity. The postmodern outlook 
entails the end of the appeal to any central legitimating myth whatso-
ever. Not only have all the reigning master narratives lost their credi-
bility, but the idea of a grand narrative is itself no longer credible. [ ... J 
Consequently, the postmodern outlook demands an attack on any 
claimant to universality-it demands, in fact, a "war on totality."28 
And if metanarratives are simply orienting stories with universal claims, 
then it must be the case that the biblical narrative which grounds Christian 
faith is also a metanarrative. As a resuit, we are put in a position of choos-
ing between postmodernism-which, of course, is defined by "incredulity 
toward metanarratives" -and Christian faith. Thus, like Middleton and 
Walsh, Grenz concludes that Christian scholars must ultimately part ways 
with the postmodern critique of metanarratives, though they might adopt 
it to a certain extent: 
To put this in another way, we might say that because of our faith in 
Christ, we cannot totally affirm the central tenet of postmodernism as 
defined by Lyotard-the rejection of the metanarrative. We may wel-
come Lyotard's conclusion when applied to the chief concern of his 
analysis-namely, the scientific enterprise. [ ... J Contrary to the impli-
cations of Lyotard's thesis, we firmly believe that the local narratives 
of the many human communities do fit together into a single grand 
narrative, the story of humankind. [ ... J As Christians, we claim to 
know what that gr~nd narrative is.29 
But isn't that trying to have our cake and eat it, too? To arbitrarily say that 
the postmodem critique applies to Enlightenment or scientific claims but 
not Christian claims by appealing to the fact that we believe the one and 
not the other is to beg the question. Further, and more to my point here, 
Grenz paints himself into a comer by failing to understand what really 
constitutes a metanarrative.3(l It seems we need to read Lyotard again (for 
the first time). 
By failing to appreciate Lyotard's very specific meaning of "metanarra-
tive," Christian philosophers and theologians have created a phantom 
problem which ultimately proposes a false dichotomy: either postmod-
emism or Christian faith. Invoking Luther's notion of thcologia crucis (ver-
sus theologia gloriae) Brian Ingraffia poses this bifurcation in the starkest of 
terms: "The theology of the cross pronounces an either/or: either biblical 
revelation or philosophical speculation. The same either/or must be pro-
claimed to the present age: either biblical theology or postmodern theo-
ry."31 While more nuanced in Grenz, Middleton and Walsh, the proposed 
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dichotomy remains operative precisely because of a misinterpretation of 
Lyotard on postmodernism and metanarratives. As a corrective, we will 
engage in a closer reading of the The Postmodern Condition in Part II. 
II 
In postmodernity, the rules of the game have changed. In particular, 
changes have taken place" since the end of the nineteenth century" which 
"have altered the game rules for science, literature, and the arts." In other 
words, postmodernism is characterized by a shift in the criteria of knowl-
edge; it is an epistemological matter.32 Lyotard sets the stage for his discus-
sion by chronicling a conflict between "science" and "narratives": when 
judged by the criteria of modern science, stories and narratives are little 
more than "fables." When pushed, however, science must legitimate itself: 
it must produce a "discourse of legitimation" which Lyotard simply calls 
"philosophy." So before determining what "postmodern" would mean, he 
first defines what he means by "modern": "I will use the term modern to 
designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a meta dis-
course of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such 
as the dialectics of Spirit [Hegel], the hermeneutics of meaning 
[Schleiermacher?], the emancipation of the rational [Kant] or working sub-
ject [Marx], or the creation of wealth [Smith]."33 The question of the rela-
tion between modernity and postmodernity revolves around this issue of 
"legitimation. " 
The process of legitimation or justification must be thought within the 
pragmatics of communication: Every discourse of legitimation is "sent" by 
a "sender" to an "addressee." In order for there to be legitimation, there 
must be a consensus between sender and addressee. But in order for this to 
occur, sender and addressee must already agree upon the rules of the 
game--must already have committed themselves to language and mean-
ings which will be shared and agreed upon. Thus, while purporting to 
legitimate or justify itself to another who does not agree, a discourse of 
legitimation must presume an original consensus. So legitimation occurs 
only for those who agree to play the game by the same rules. While not 
exactly preaching to the choir, it is a matter of preaching to those who have 
agreed to come to church. What this means, however, is that the great dis-
courses of legitimation in, say, the Enlightenment, are in fact predicated 
upon an agreed upon narrative which established the rules of the game. 
In order to appreciate this infiltration of narrative into science, we need 
to consider more closely Lyotard's account of what he describes as "narra-
tive knowledge" and "scientific knowledge." As we have already noted, 
this unfolds within a framework of language theory and an analysis of the 
pragmatics of discourse.3" Unpacking the triad of sender, message, and 
addressee, and noting the consensus which is required for such communi-
cation to take place, Lyotard (pace Wittgenstein) refers to such shared prag-
matics as "language games" in which the rules of the game are agreed 
upon by those who choose to play. Of each game he notes: "their rules do 
not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of a 
contract, explicit or not, between players."35 Further, these shared rules 
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both require and produce a social bond; this is why "the question of the 
social bond, insofar as it is a question, is itself a language game."36 
With this methodological framework of language game pragmatics in 
place, we can now consider the pragmatics of "narrative" knowledge as dis-
tinguished from the pragmatics of "scientific" knowledge-a distinction 
between "myth" and "science"37 (or, I would suggest, "faith" and "reason"). 
"Narrative" knowledge (which Lyotard also refers to as "traditional" 
knowledge, or what we might describe, given his categories, as premodern 
knowledge) is grounded in the "custom" of a culture and, as such, does not 
require legitimation. Lyotard links this to a kind of "tribal" paradigm in 
which the homogeneity of "a people" (Valk), coupled with the "authority" 
of a narrator, produces a kind of immediate auto-legitimation. "The narra-
tives themselves have this authority," he notes. In a sense, "the people are 
only that which actualizes the narratives."3S Legitimation is not demanded 
but rather is implicit in the narrative itself as a story of the people. 
In contrast to this auto-legitimation, modem scientific culture external-
izes the problem of legitimation. The two pragmatic poles of sender and 
addressee are distinguished, and the addressee demands of the sender jus-
tification for messages sent her way. I must now provide "proof."'" 
However, the homogeneity of the premodern Valk has dissolved; therefore, 
we have no immediate or previously agreed upon consensus; we do not all 
share the same language game. As such, modem legitimation has recourse 
to a universal criterion: Reason. It is this move which generates what 
Lyotard famously describes as "metanarratives": appeals to criteria of 
legitimation which are understood as standing outside any particular lan-
guage game and thus guarantee "universal" truth. 
And it is precisely here that we locate postmodernity's incredulity 
toward metanarratives: they are just another language game, albeit mas-
querading as the game above all games. Or as Lyotard puts it, scientific 
knowledge, which considered itself to be a triumph over narrative knowl-
edge, covertly grounds itself in a narrative (i.e., an originary myth).4o In par-
ticular, Lyotard analyzes two modem "narratives of legitimation": first, the 
humanistic metanarrative of emancipation (as found in Kant and Marx), 
and second, the metanarrative concerning the life of the Spirit in German 
Idealism."! But we can see this infusing of myth in knowledge as far back 
as Plato, where "the new language game of science posed the problem of 
its own legitimation at the very beginning."42 In Books VI and VII of the 
Republic, for instance, the answer to the question of legitimation (here both 
epistemological and sociopolitical) "comes in the form of a narrative--the 
allegory of the cave, which recounts how and why men yearn for narra-
tives and fail to recognize knowledge. Knowledge is thus founded on the 
narrative of its own martyrdom."43 In a similar way, Lyotard argues, mod-
em scientific knowledge, when called upon (by itself) to legitimate itself, 
cannot help but appeal to narrative--this "return of the narrative in the 
non-narrative" is "inevitable."""' Whenever science attempts to legitimate 
itself, it is no longer scientific but narrative, appealing to an orienting myth 
which is not susceptible to scientific legitimation."' Science demands of 
itself the impossible: "the language game of science desires its statements 
to be true but does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its 
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own."46 The appeal to "Reason" as the criterion for what constitutes 
knowledge is but one more language game among many, shaped by 
founding beliefs or commitments which determine what constitutes 
"knowledge" within the game; reason is grounded in myth. 
"Metanarratives," then, are the term Lyotard ascribes to these false appeals 
to universal, rational, scientific criteria-as though they were divorced 
from any particular game and transcend all language games. 
Here we must return to the question posed at the close of Part I: If post-
modernity is "incredulity towards metanarratives," then would postmod-
ernism signal a rejection of Christian faith insofar as it is based on the 
"grand story" of the Scriptures? I think the answer is clearly negative, 
since the biblical narrative and Christian faith does not claim to be legiti-
mated by an appeal to a universal, autonomous Reason, but rather by an 
appeal to faith (or, to translate, "myth" or "narrative"),'? Lyotard very 
specifically defines metanarratives as universal discourses of legitimation 
which mask their own particularity; or to put it another way, metanarra-
tives deny their narrative ground even as they proceed upon on it as a 
basis. In particular, we must note that the postmodern critique is not 
aimed at metanarratives because they are really grounded in narratives; on 
the contrary, the problem with metanarratives is that they do not own up 
to their own mythic ground."" Postmodernism is not incredulity toward 
narrative or myth; on the contrary, it unveils that all knowledge is ground-
ed in such. Once we appreciate this, the (false) dichotomy which 
Middleton and Walsh, Grenz, Ingraffia, and others propose is dissolved 
insofar as the biblical narrative is not properly a "metanarrative." As a 
result, new space is opened for a Christian appropriation of the postmod-
em critique of Enlightenment rationality.<9 
What characterizes the postmodern condition, then, is not a rejection of 
grand stories in terms of scope or the sense of epic claims, but rather an 
unveiling of the fact that all knowledge is rooted in some narrative or myth. 
ThE' result, of course (and here I note one of the genuine problems of post-
modernity), is what Lyotard describes as a "problem of legitimation"Sl) (or 
what Habermas describes as a "legitimation crisis") since what we thought 
were universal criteria have been unveiled as just one game among many.5) 
If we consider, for instance, the reality of deep mom I diversity and compet-
ing visions of the Good, postmodern society is at a loss to adjudicate the 
competing claims. There can be no appeal to a higher court that would 
transcend a historical context or language game, no neutral observer nor 
'God's-eye-view' which can legitimate or justify one paradigm or moral lan-
guage game above another. If all moral claims are conditioned by para-
digms of historical commitment, then they cannot transcend those condi-
tions; thus, every moral claim operates within a 'logic' that is conditioned 
by the paradigm. Or, in other words, every language game has its own set 
of rules. As a result, criteria which determine what constitutes 'evidence' 
or 'proof' must be game-relative: they will function as rules only for those 
who share the same paradigm or participate in the same language game. 
Arguments or defenses of moral claims operate on the basis of intm-para-
digm or intra-game criteria; as such, the arguments carry force only insofar 
as the addressee shares the same paradigm; in this case there would be a 
MET ANARRATIVES 361 
consensus between the sender and addressee of a statement. If, however, 
the sender of the argument and the addressee live in different language 
games, then the argument is bound to be lost in the mai1." The incommen-
surability of language games means that there is a plurality of logics which 
precludes any demonstrative appeal to a "common reason." Or again, in 
the model of language games, the rules for distinct games are not propor-
tiona!.'3 The pragmatics of justification, which requires a reversibility (i.e., 
consensus) between the sender and addressees, is precisely that which is 
denied between language games. "[T]he problem," Lyotard notes, "is 
indeed one of translation and translatability. It so happens that languages 
are translatable, otherwise they are not languages; but language games are 
not translatable, because if they were, they would not be language games" 
(p. 53).54 Recognition of the incommensurability of language games means 
that there is no consensus, no sensus communis.55 
In the face of this problem, we must not lose sight of the fact that what 
constitutes the postmodern condition is precisely a plurality of language 
games-a condition in which no 0111' story can claim either auto-legitima-
tion (because of the plurality of "the people") nor appeal to a phantom uni-
versal "Reason" (because Reason is just one game among others, which is 
itself rooted in a narrative)." And this plurality is based on the fact that 
each game is grounded in different "narratives" or myths (i.e., founding 
beliefs). Whether we understand this as a new Babel or a new Pentecost, I 
shall argue in the final section that this situation-though posing a chal-
lenge-also presents a lmique opportunity for religious thought. 
III 
At root, I would argue that what is at stake in postmodemism is the relation-
ship between faith and reason. When Lyotard describes postmodernism as 
"incredulity toward metanarratives," he indicates a suspicion and critique 
of the very idea of an autonomous Reason-a universal rationality without 
commitments. Modernity's metanarratives cannot disengage themselves 
from narratives as their ultimate ground, and thus cannot divorce them-
selves from "myth"--orienting beliefs which themselves are not subject to 
rational legitimation. In this light, consider, for instance, Kuhn's analyses 
concerning the role of paradigms in scientific research. Dominated by the 
language of faith,57 Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions points out 
the role of paradigms, as "constellations of belief,"5s in orienting how we 
perceive our world and what we consider kn.owledge and truth. In other 
words, science finds itself grounded in prior beliefs which do not admit of 
legitimation, but rather function as the basis for further legitimation. The 
paradigm itself is a "belief" -a matter of faith. It is also at this level that 
Wittgenstein notes: "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached 
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply 
what I do."'5g To this list we could add Gadamer, Polanyi, Derrida, and oth-
ers;6ll common to all of them is a delimitation of rationality, particularly 
Enlightenment ideals of scientific, objective rationality. In this sense, the postmodern critique described by Lyotard as 
"incredulity toward metanarratives" represents a displacement of the 
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notion of autonomous reason as itself a myth.b! And that, it seems to me, is 
a project with which Christian scholars ought to ally themselves, particu-
larly once we have clarified that such an alliance does not require jettison-
ing the biblical narrative. By calling into question the idea of an 
autonomous, objective, neutral rationality, I have argued that postmoder-
nity represents the retrieval of a fundamentally Augustinian epistemology 
which is attentive to the structural necessity of faith preceding reason, 
believing in order to understand.62 While this Augustinian structure is for-
malized-in the sense that there are a plurality of faiths, as many as there 
are language games-the structure (of faith preceding reason) remains in 
place, in contrast to modern (and perhaps even Thomistic63) epistemolo-
gies. The incredulity of postmodernity toward metanarratives is due to the 
fact that modernity denies its own commitments, renounces its faith, while 
at the same time never escaping it. Postmodernism refuses to believe the 
Enlightenment is without a creed. But note: the postmodern critique does 
not demand that modern thought relinquish its faith (a modern gesture to 
be sure), but to own up to it-to openly confess its credo. Thus we might 
consider the postmodern critique as a revaluing of myth, of orienting faith, 
providing new spaces for religious discourse--and in particular, an inte-
grally Christian philosophy-in a climate where it has been demonstrated 
that everyone's "got religion." 
How will this insight be helpful to Christian philosophers? My point is 
not to suggest that Lyotard's analysis concretely helps us to understand 
Christian faith; in other words, I am not arguing that we look to Lyotard 
for assistance in helping us to understand Christian faith commitments. 
Rather, 1 think that "Christian philosophers"-whose faith is an integral 
aspect of their philosophy and their philosophizing64-should find in 
Lyotard's critique of metanarratives and autonomous Reason an ally 
wruch opens up the space for a radically Christian philosophy. By calling 
into question the very ideal of a universal, autonomous Reason (which 
was, in the Enlightenment, the basis for rejecting 'religious thought'), and 
further demonstrating that all knowledge is grounded in "narrative" or 
"myth," Lyotard relativizes (secular) philosophy's claim to autonomy, and 
so grants the legitimacy of a philosophy which grounds itself in Christian 
faith. Previously, such a distinctly "Christian philosophy" would have 
been exiled from the "pure" arena of philosophy because of its "infection" 
with bias and prejudice. Lyotard's critique, however, demonstrates that no 
philosophy-indeed, no knowledge-is untainted by prejudice or faith-
commitments. In this way the playing field is leveled and new opportuni-
ties to voice a Christian philosophy are created. So Lyotard's postmodern 
critique of metanarratives, rather than being a formidable foe of Christian 
faith and thought, can in fact be enlisted as an ally in the construction of a 
Christian philosophy.65 
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